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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David Arthur appeals from the district court's orders revoking his probation and 
executing his original sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, and from the district 
court's order denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion seeking a 
reduction of his sentence following revocation. As a threshold matter, he asserts that 
the waiver of his appellate rights that was contained in his original plea agreement does 
not extend to the subsequent probation revocation proceedings in his case, and 
therefore his appeal is properly justiciable by this Court. He further asserts that, 
because his single probation violation was not willful, the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked his probation and executed his original sentence without first 
considering whether there were adequate alternatives to revocation of his probation that 
would be adequate to address this violation. Finally, Mr. Arthur asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his 
sentence following the revocation of his probation because the district court failed to 
recognize its discretion to adjudicate the merits of his motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
David Arthur pleaded guilty pursuant to a binding Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea 
agreement to one count of felony driving under the influence. (3/17/09 Tr.1, p.3, L.21 -
p.17, L.7; R., pp.49-51.) One of the terms of this agreement was the following: 
1 Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, for ease 
of reference, citations made to the transcript are made herein in accordance with the 
date of the proceeding transcribed. 
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As part of the plea agreement, Defendant hereby waives any appeals that 
may lawfully be waived, including, but not limited to, any appeal pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and any appeal for post-conviction relief. 
(R., p.51.) 
However, during the change of plea hearing, the district court clarified the 
parameters of this waiver as being limited to a waiver of appeals from the district court's 
original sentencing determination, from any Rule 35 motions made from the original 
sentencing, or from a post-conviction action. (3/17/09 Tr., p.4, Ls.20-23.) This plea 
agreement called for Mr. Arthur to be placed on probation for a period of four years. 
(R., p.50.) 
Thereafter, the district court sentenced Mr. Arthur to 10 years, with five years 
fixed, and placed him on probation for four years. (5/28/09 Tr., p.12, Ls.3-20; R., pp.61-
67.) Prior to the expiration of this period of probation, an agent's warrant was issued 
against Mr. Arthur on the basis of alleged violations of the terms and conditions of his 
probation. (R., pp.72-73.) The State's Petition for Probation Violation ultimately alleged 
that Mr. Arthur had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by consuming 
alcohol and changing his residence without prior approval from his probation officer. 
(R., pp.76-80.) The State also appended an admission from Mr. Arthur that he had 
consumed alcohol on two occasions. (R., p.81.) 
Mr. Arthur ultimately admitted to consuming alcohol, and the State dismissed the 
allegation that he had violated his probation by changing his residence without prior 
approval. (7/23/10 Tr., p.2, L.6 - p.5, L.3.) At the disposition hearing, the State 
recommended reinstating Mr. Arthur on probation so long as he successfully completed 
therapeutic programming from the New Life Program. (8/30/10 Tr., p.19, L.2 - p.20, 
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L.4.) The district court entered an order reflecting these amended probation terms. (R., 
p.93.) 
The State then filed a second petition for probation violations. (R., pp.100-106.) 
This petition alleged that Mr. Arthur had violated the amended terms and conditions of 
his probation by failing to complete the New Life Program as ordered by the district 
court due to disciplinary sanctions and by refusing to submit to alcohol or controlled 
substance testing at the request of his probation officer. (R., pp.102-103.) The State 
also submitted a termination summary that discussed the reasons for Mr. Arthur's 
termination from the New Life Program. (R., p.106.) 
Mr. Arthur admitted to having violated his probation by failing to complete the 
New Life Program, and the State dismissed the remaining allegation that he had 
refused to comply with a request to submit to testing for alcohol or controlled 
substances. (10/13/10 Tr., p.3, L.24 - p.8, L.7.) 
The district court revoked Mr. Arthur's probation and executed his original 
sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, without any reduction. (11/22/10 Tr., p.41, 
L.22 - p.42, L.18; R., pp.120-121.) During the probation violation disposition hearing, 
the district court twice addressed Mr. Arthur's right to appeal from the court's 
determination to revoke his probation and execute his original sentence. First, the 
district court told Mr. Arthur that he had a right to appeal from this disposition. (11/22/10 
Tr., p.42, Ls.9-14.) Second, the district court confirmed thereafter that Mr. Arthur 
understood that he had a right to appeal from this disposition order. (11/22/10 Tr., p.42, 
Ls.16-18.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Arthur filed a Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his sentence. 
(R., pp.115-119.) He also provided the district court with a statement in support of his 
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request for a reduction of his underlying sentence. (R., p.118.) In this statement, 
Mr. Arthur explained to the district court that his inability to provide a urine sample for 
alcohol testing while in the New Life Program was attributable to a condition that he 
referred to as a "shy bladder." (R., p.118.) 
Additionally, IVlr. Arthur noted his mother's and sister's deteriorating health - both 
apparently had issues with strokes and seizures. (R., p.118.) In light of the serious 
medical conditions that his family members suffered, Mr. Arthur requested a reduction 
of his fixed time in order to be able to care for his mother and sister. (R., p.118.) 
Finally, Mr. Arthur noted issues regarding prison overcrowding in support of his Rule 35 
motion. (R., p.118.) 
The district court denied Mr. Arthur's Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.129-130.) In doing 
so, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits of this 
motion in light of the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522 (Ct. 
App. 1994). (R., pp.129-130.) Therefore, the court denied this motion without 
considering the merits of Mr. Arthur's request for leniency. 
Mr. Arthur timely appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation 
and executing his original sentence, as well as from the denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
( R., p. 122.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Arthur's right to appeal from the district court's disposition of his 
probation revocation proceedings and subsequent timely filed Rule 35 motion 
waived by Mr. Arthur's original plea agreement? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Arthur's probation 
without first considering whether this violation was willful and whether alternative 
means would be adequate to address the violation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Arthur's timely Rule 35 
motion seeking a reduction of his sentence following the revocation of his 
probation because the district court failed to recognize its discretion to entertain 




Mr. Arthur's Right To Appeal From The District Court's Disposition Of His Probation 
Revocation Proceedings And Subsequent Timely Filed Rule 35 Motion Were Not 
Waived By Mr. Arthur's Original Plea Agreement 
As an initial matter, Mr. Arthur submits that the prospective waiver of his 
appellate rights that was a part of his original plea agreement did not encompass a 
waiver of the right to appeal from subsequent probation revocation proceedings. 
Moreover, to the extent that there is any ambiguity regarding the scope of any appellate 
waiver in this case, that ambiguity must be construed against the State and in 
Mr. Arthur's favor. 
Plea agreements, being contractual in nature, are generally interpreted by this 
Court in accordance with contract law principles. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 
267, 270 (Ct. App. 2006). This includes review for whether the terms of the contract are 
ambiguous. When the language in a plea agreement is ambiguous, this Court will hold 
any ambiguity against the State and in favor of the defendant. State v. Peterson, 148 
Idaho 593, 595 (2010). As held by the Peterson Court: 
Ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the 
defendant. "As with other contracts, provisions of plea agreements are 
occasionally ambiguous; the government 'ordinarily must bear 
responsibility for any lack of clarity."' "[A]mbiguities are construed in favor 
of the defendant. Focusing on the defendant's reasonable understanding 
also reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant 
to plead guilty." 
Id. at 596 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). "When interpreting a 
term of a contract, this Court is obligated to view the entire agreement as a whole to 
discern the parties' intentions." Henderson v. Henderson Investment Properties, 148 
Idaho 638, 640 (2010). 
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"Guilty pleas have been carefully scrutinized to determine whether the accused 
knew and understood all the rights to which he would be entitled at trial, and that he 
intentionally chose to forego them." Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 237 
(1973). While a party may prospectively waive rights on appeal, such a waiver must be, 
"an intentional relinquishment of a known right," - which has been held to require that 
the waiver be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 
466 (1969). Any waiver contained within a plea agreement that cannot meet this 
standard violates due process and will be held void. Id. 
Finally, where the plain language of the plea agreement does not appear to 
encompass or contemplate proceedings beyond the initial sentencing hearing, terms 
contained within the plea agreement will generally not be deemed to carry over to those 
subsequent proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 785 (2010). 
Revocation of probation, although subject to substantial due process protection, has 
been deemed not to be part of a criminal prosecution. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778, 781 (1973). 
In this case, Mr. Arthur entered a plea agreement early on that, "[a]s a part of the 
plea agreement, Defendant hereby expressly waives any appeals that may be lawfully 
waived, including, but not limited to, any appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and 
any appeal for Post Conviction Relief." (R., p.51.) However, in clarifying the scope of 
this waiver, the district court in this case noted that this term constituted only a, "waiver 
of appeals challenging the sentence, if the Court goes along with it, bringing a Rule 35, 
or appealing that issue with relation to post-conviction." (3/17/09 Tr., p.4, Ls.20-23.) 
Each instance of the waiver identified by the court was tacked specifically to the district 
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court's initial sentencing determination, and did not extend beyond the sentencing stage 
to subsequent probation proceedings that might occur years into the future. 
Additionally, the understanding of all of the parties that Mr. Arthur's waiver did not 
extend to probation revocation proceedings is reflected in the district court's advisories 
to him upon revoking his probation. Not only did the district court directly inform him 
that he had the right to appeal from this order, but the court took the additional step of 
confirming that Mr. Arthur understood that he had this right to appeal. (11/22/10 Tr., 
p.42, Ls.7-18.) 
By its terms, the waiver of the right to appeal contained in Mr. Arthur's original 
plea agreement does not contain any language that indicated this waiver would extend 
to probation revocation proceedings. The record of the statements made indicating the 
understanding of the parties regarding this waiver likewise demonstrates that no waiver 
of appellate rights regarding probation revocation proceedings was contemplated. 
Given that the parties did not appear to contemplate the application of this waiver to 
separate and subsequent probation revocation proceedings, there could not have been 
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary prospective waiver of these appellate rights. 
This conclusion is particularly strengthened in light of the fact that probation 
revocation proceedings are not a part of the underlying criminal action. Therefore, the 
probation revocation disposition that Mr. Arthur is appealing from in this case was a 
separate proceeding than the underling criminal action out of which this waiver arose. 
Finally, even if this Court were to find that the appellate waiver in this case was 
ambiguous as to whether Mr. Arthur's right to appeal from probation revocation 
proceedings was waived, that ambiguity must be strictly construed against the State 
and in Mr. Arthur's favor. 
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II. 
The District Court Abuse Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Arthur's Probation Without 
First Considering Whether This Violation Was Willful And Whether Alternative Means 
Would Be Adequate To Address The Violation 
The single probation violation upon which Mr. Arthur's probation was revoked 
was his discharge from the New Life Program at the Lighthouse Rescue Mission. 
(10/13/10 Tr., p.3, L.24 - p.8, L.7; R., pp.102-106.) According to the discharge sheet 
from the New Life Program, Mr. Arthur's discharge was attributable to his inability -
termed a "passive refusal" - to provide a urine sample on command in order to submit 
this sample for testing for alcohol or controlled substances. This form also indicated 
that Mr. Arthur had made a couple of unauthorized phone calls and "objected to 
religious aspects of the program." (R., p.106.) However, the facts revealed at the 
disposition hearing on this violation revealed that the facts that led to his discharge were 
not the result of willful conduct on Mr. Arthur's part, and therefore the district court 
abused its discretion when it failed to consider whether lesser sanctions were adequate 
to address Mr. Arthur's single violation. 
There are generally two questions that must be determined by the district court in 
addressing allegations of probation violations: first, the court must determine whether 
the defendant actually violated the terms and conditions of his probation; and second, if 
a violation of probation has been found, the trial court must then decide the appropriate 
remedy for the violation. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). 'The 
determination of whether a probation violation has been established is separate from 
the decision of what consequence, if any, to impose for the violation." Id. (quoting State 
v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 799 (2004)). The trial court's decision to revoke probation 
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and execute a defendant's underlying sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless 
an abuse of discretion is shown. Id. 
However, while the district court generally has broad discretion in making the 
determination whether to revoke a defendant's probation, that discretion is curtailed if 
the alleged probation violation has not been shown to have been willful on the 
defendant's part. Where a violation of the terms of probation was not willful on the part 
of the defendant, or was due to circumstances outside of the defendant's control, the 
district court may not revoke probation without first considering whether there were any 
adequate alternative methods to address the violation. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106 
(quoting State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct App. 2001 )). 
At the probation violation disposition hearing in this case, Mr. Arthur informed the 
district court that, upon being incarcerated the same day as he was unable to provide a 
urine sample for drug testing at the Lighthouse facility, he had actually requested that 
the jail take blood and urine samples from him for purposes of testing. (11/22/10 Tr., 
p.32, Ls.17-25.) While he tried to contact his probation officer in order to have these 
samples tested, his probation officer did not respond to his efforts. (11/22/10 Tr., p.32, 
Ls.17-25.) 
Additionally, Mr. Arthur explained that his difficulties in providing the urine sample 
for testing, which was his reason for discharge from the New Life Program, were largely 
attributable to a condition known as a "shy bladder." (11/22/10 Tr., p.33, Ls.7-25.) 
Because of his condition, the situational pressures of the manner in which his urine 
sample was to be taken rendered him unable to provide the sample at that time. 
(11/22/10 Tr., p.33, Ls.7-25.) Mr. Arthur further noted that there was no evidence at all 
that he had actually relapsed or used alcohol. (11/22/10 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-12.) 
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Other issues that Mr. Arthur encountered with the New Life Program flowed from 
conflicts in the religious ideology underpinning this program and the traditional Native 
American heritage. (11/22/10 Tr., p.35, Ls.7-23.) Mr. Arthur's father and family 
members are active practitioners of traditional Native American practices, including 
participation in sweat lodges, and there were insinuations raised during the programs 
that Mr. Arthur was participating in that his close family members "worshipped false 
idols." (11/22/10 Tr., p.35, Ls.7-12.) Ultimately, and to Mr. Arthur's credit, he made 
successful efforts to both stand up for his personal heritage and to bring this conflict to a 
positive resolution. (11/22/10 Tr., p.35, Ls.18-24.) Mr. Arthur's act of standing up for 
his ethnic and religious heritage was not any act of willful resistance to his rehabilitative 
process, nor should it have been deemed to be such by either the district court or those 
charged with his therapeutic programming. 
Mr. Arthur's single violation was not demonstrated to have been the result of 
willful actions on his part. The district court in this case was therefore required to 
consider whether there were adequate alternative means to address this violation short 
of revocation of probation that would sufficiently address this violation. The district court 
did not do so. The record also reflects that there were such adequate alternative 
means, as both Mr. Arthur and the State advocated for a period of retained jurisdiction 
as the proper remedy for the violation. In light of this, the district court abused its 




The District Court Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Arthur's Timely Rule 35 Motion 
Seeking A Reduction Of His Sentence Following The Revocation Of His Probation 
Because The District Court Failed To Recognize Its Discretion To Entertain The Merits 
Of This Motion 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 permits a district court, upon revoking a defendant's 
probation, to reduce the defendant's underlying sentence upon revocation, either sua 
sponte or upon the defendant's motion. See, e.g., State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670,672 
(Ct. App. 1998). The decision whether to grant a reduction of the defendant's sentence 
pursuant to this rule is a matter of the trial court's discretion. State v. Hanson, 150 
Idaho 729, 249 P .3d 1184, 1188 (Ct. App. 2011 ). This Court reviews a district court's 
discretionary determination for whether: (1) the district court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the court acted within the bounds of that 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards that apply to the court's 
determination, and (3) whether the court reached its decision through an exercise of 
reason. See, e.g., State v. Anderson,_ Idaho_, 2011 WL 37931392 , *1. Where 
the district court fails to recognize its discretion to take action in a particular case, an 
abuse of discretion is shown and reversal is required. Id. 
The district court in this case failed to recognize its discretion in ruling on 
Mr. Arthur's Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his sentence, and failed to act in 
accordance with reason, when the court erroneously ruled that Mr. Arthur was barred 
from seeking relief under Rule 35 under the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. 
Wade, 125 Idaho 522 (Ct. App. 1994 ). 
2 As of the writing of this Appellant's Brief, the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. 
Anderson has not yet been released for publication in the permanent law reports, and 
therefore is subject to revision or withdrawal. 
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In Wade, the defendant filed a Rule 35 motion after the district court imposed the 
exact sentence that both the defendant and the State had bargained for in the binding 
Rule 11 (d)(1 )(C) agreement. Wade, 125 Idaho at 525. In this case, the Wade Court 
noted that the defendant's claim was specifically that the defendant's sentence was 
unreasonable when it was originally imposed. Id. Because the nature of the 
defendant's challenge, along with his stipulation as to the appropriate sentence under 
the binding plea agreement, the Wade Court held the defendant's motion was frivolous. 
But the Wade Court noted that there may have been an abuse of discretion had 
the defendant presented new and additional information that would have justified a 
reduction of the defendant's sentence. Id. (noting that, "if there is any colorable merit to 
Wade's motion, it must arise from new or additional information that would create a 
basis for reduction of sentence."). Given this, even when the defendant is seeking a 
reduction of sentence from the original sentencing disposition under Rule 35, the fact 
that a defendant entered into a binding Rule 11 plea agreement does not deprive the 
district court of discretion to act on the motion seeking a reduction of that sentence. 
Contrary to the district court's-finding, entering into a binding plea agreement with 
regard to sentencing does not deprive the defendant of the right to subsequently seek a 
reduction of that sentence in light of new and additional information. Nor does the 
district court lack jurisdiction to entertain the merits of such a motion. This conclusion is 
particularly strengthened in light of the nature of the district court's sentencing review 
and determinations upon the revocation of probation. 
"The duty of the trial court to provide an individualized sentence requires that the 
court have access to the broadest possible range of information about the defendant." 
State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 95,896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Ct. App. 1995). And this duty 
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does is not limited to the initial sentencing of criminal defendants, as sentencing 
determinations may also be revisited in those cases where a defendant has been 
placed on probation, but subsequently violates the terms and conditions of his or her 
release. At the disposition of a probation violation, the district court is not left solely with 
the options of reinstating or revoking probation. Rather, the court possesses inherent 
authority to re-examine the defendant's underlying sentence and to reduce that 
sentence in light of mitigating evidence. See, e.g., State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 
400 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In fact, a reduction of the defendant's sentence may often be warranted given 
that the district court may have initially articulated a lengthy underlying sentence as an 
incentive for the defendant to comply with the strictures of his or her probation. The 
policies for such initial sentencing determinations were articulated by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in State v. Jones: 
It is a common practice for a trial court to impose a rather severe 
underlying sentence as an incentive for the defendant to perform well in 
the retained jurisdiction program and to comply with probation terms if the 
defendant is placed on probation. A lengthy underlying sentence also 
preserves the judge's options until such time as probation may be denied 
or revoked, when the court can decide whether the sentence should be 
reduced. A long underlying sentence thus provides the judge a hedge 
against the uncertainty of the defendant's future performance. 
State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Under these standards, and in light of the district court's duty to provide a 
sentence which truly measures the culpability of the underlying offense and offender, 
every piece of evidence that would inform the district court's sentencing determination 
becomes critical to the underlying outcome of the proceedings. And the district court's 
review of the record in probation disposition proceedings is plenary - the trial court can 
and should make an examination of the entire record and all facts pertinent to its 
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sentencing determination, regardless of whether those facts arose before or after the 
defendant was placed on probation. See State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 287 (Ct. App. 
2010). 
In light of this, it is entirely appropriate for a defendant to file a Rule 35 motion 
seeking a reduction of his sentence upon the revocation of probation, even where the 
defendant entered into a binding Rule 11 plea agreement at the time of of the 
defendant's original sentencing. The district court never found that Mr. Arthur failed to 
submit new and additional information, arising after the time of sentencing, that would 
have justified a reduction of his sentence. The court merely found that Mr. Arthur was 
precluded from making this request in the first place. Because the district court failed to 
recognize Mr. Arthur's legal right to seek a reduction of his sentence upon the 
revocation of his probation, and likewise failed to recognize its own discretion to 
entertain the merits of this motion, the district court abused its discretion in denying 
Mr. Arthur's Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Arthur respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
revoking his probation and ordering his original sentence into execution, and remand 
this case for further proceedings. In the alternative, he asks that this Court reverse the 
district court's order denying his Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his sentence and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 14th day of October, 2011. 
SA AH E. TOM S 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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